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PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-
FIFTH AMENDMENT:  THE DIFFICULTIES POSED 
BY PSYCHOLOGICAL ILLNESS 
Robert E. Gilbert* 
INTRODUCTION 
History tells us that Presidents do more than win nominations and 
elections.  They even do more than govern.  They also do many of the same 
things that non-presidents do.  They are energized and they become weary, 
they succeed and they fail, they rejoice and they mourn, they become sick 
and they die.  The Framers of the Constitution surely knew that the latter 
would be the case.  All of them lived in states that had governors, and some 
of those governors had gotten sick and had died.  So they realized only too 
well that the same fate would befall Presidents.  After deciding that the 
United States would have a President, and only one President, and after 
deciding how the President would be elected and some of the powers he 
would be given, the Framers turned their attention to the problems of 
presidential disability, death, and succession—but they did so toward the 
end of the Constitutional Convention, when they were tired and anxious to 
go home.  In September 1787, they inserted the following clause into the 
draft Constitution:  “[I]n case of [the President’s] removal as aforesaid, 
death, absence, resignation or inability to discharge the powers and duties 
of his office, the vice-president shall exercise those powers and duties until 
another President be chosen, or until the inability of the President be 
removed.”1 
A few days later, however, the draft constitution went to the Committee 
of Style for polishing, and this particular provision came back to the 
Framers in a quite different form.  It then read:  “In case of the removal of 
the president from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to 
discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve 
on the vice-president.”2 
 
*  Robert E. Gilbert is the Edward W. Brooke Professor of Political Science at Northeastern 
University.  He is the author of four books and numerous journal articles published in the 
United States and abroad.  His main teaching and research interests are in American politics, 
specifically, the presidency, the media, political parties, and elections.  
 1. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 499 (Max Farrand ed., 
1937). 
 2. Id. at 598–99. 
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This wording—which was accepted by the Framers and incorporated into 
the Constitution as Article II, Section 1, Clause 5—presented three 
significant problems: 
1)  It is not clear to what “the same” refers.  Do these words refer to the 
presidential office or to the powers and duties of the presidential office?  
The difference between the two is significant.  If the presidential office 
passes to the Vice President, the Vice President becomes President; if the 
powers and duties of the office pass to the Vice President, the Vice 
President only serves as Acting President.  The latter is what the Framers 
seemed to intend, but their intentions became clouded in the final wording 
of the Constitution. 
2)  It is not clear what the Framers meant by “inability.”  Also unclear is 
who determines “inability,” how “inability” is determined, and who 
determines when and if “inability” has ended. 
3)  The Framers placed in the same sentence of the Constitution three 
permanent conditions under which a President may leave office (removal, 
death, and resignation) with one temporary or even fleeting condition 
(inability).  If the Vice President inherits the office of the presidency when 
any one of these conditions exists, it is unclear whether a disabled President 
could get back the office after the inability ended.  It is not surprising, then, 
that, for much of American history, Presidents were reluctant to admit 
publicly that they were ill or disabled because this admission might have 
provoked a constitutional crisis. 
I.  THE TYLER PRECEDENT AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 
The problems with this unclear constitutional language were 
compounded in 1841 when the United States saw a President die in office 
for the first time.  When William Henry Harrison died on April 4, 1841, his 
Vice President, John Tyler, insisted that he was then President of the United 
States and not merely Acting President.3  Some of his political 
contemporaries disagreed.  Former President John Quincy Adams, a 
member of the House of Representatives at the time, wrote in his diary, “I 
paid a visit this morning to Mr. Tyler, who styles himself President of the 
United States, and not Vice-President, acting as President, which would be 
the correct style.”4 
On the floor of the Senate, Senator William Allen of Ohio raised a 
troubling question.  If a Vice President becomes President when the 
President dies, resigns, is removed, or is disabled, what happens if a 
President recovers from a disability only to find the Vice President claiming 
to be President?  “What would become of the office?  Was it to vibrate 
between the two claimants?”  He then warned that if the “office” of 
 
 3. 2 LYON G. TYLER, THE LETTERS AND TIMES OF THE TYLERS 12 (Richmond, Va., 
Whittet & Shepperson Cor. 1885). 
 4. 10 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, COMPRISING PORTIONS OF HIS DIARY FROM 
1795 TO 1848, at 463 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Philadelphia, Pa., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 
1876). 
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President devolved on the Vice President in a succession event, “the most 
fearful convulsions might follow.”5 
Tyler, however, was fiercely determined, and insisted that he was, in fact, 
the nation’s new President.  To drive home the point, he took the 
presidential oath of office, gave an inaugural address in which he 
proclaimed that the presidential office had devolved on him and moved into 
the White House.6  Faced with his intransigence, Congress finally 
acquiesced.  This created a powerful precedent:  when the presidency was 
vacated permanently, the Vice President became President of the United 
States rather than Acting President. 
But the matter of temporary vacancies remained a major sore point for 
the political system.  In 1967, Congress dealt with it by adding the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.7  The Amendment does four things: 
First, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment enshrines the Tyler precedent in the 
Constitution.  Permanent vacancy in the presidency results constitutionally 
in the Vice President becoming President and not just Acting President.8  
This provision overturns the Framers’ original intentions and makes the 
Tyler precedent the law of the land.  It was invoked in 1974 when Gerald 
Ford became President after Richard Nixon’s resignation in the face of 
looming impeachment and removal from office.9 
Second, the Amendment provides for filling vacancies in the Vice 
Presidency by allowing the President to nominate a new Vice President who 
takes office when confirmed by both Houses of Congress.10  Since the Vice 
Presidency has been vacant on eighteen occasions thus far, this provision is 
a very useful addition to the Constitution.  However, Section 2 does not 
address situations in which a Vice President suffers an inability that 
prevents him or her from serving.11  It also does not address “situations of 
presidential disability during which the Vice [P]resident acts as president, 
leaving a vacancy of uncertain duration in the office of Vice [P]resident.”12  
Section 2 has been invoked twice since 1967; the first was after Spiro 
Agnew resigned the office of Vice President in 1973 and President Nixon 
 
 5. CONG. GLOBE, 27TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 5 (1841). 
 6. Joel K. Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, 30 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 505, 521–22 (1995). 
 7. A constitutional amendment pertaining to presidential disability was proposed by the 
Eisenhower Administration but such an amendment was not ratified until February 10, 1967, 
during the presidency of Lyndon Johnson. See JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH 
AMENDMENT:  ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND APPLICATIONS 54–56, 111 (2d ed. 1992). 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1. 
 9. See Marjorie Hunter, Ford Is Approved by Senate, 92-3; House Set To Act, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 28, 1973, at A1; Letter from Richard Nixon, President of the United States, to 
Henry A. Kissinger, U.S. Sec’y of State (Aug. 9, 1974), available at 
http://watergate.info/nixon/resignation-letter.shtml. 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2. 
 11. Id. 
 12. KENNETH R. CRISPELL & CARLOS F. GOMEZ, HIDDEN ILLNESS IN THE WHITE HOUSE 
208 (1988). 
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named Gerald Ford to take his place.13  The second invocation occurred in 
1974 when Ford vacated the Vice Presidency to become President and then 
nominated Nelson Rockefeller to succeed him as Vice President.14 
Third, although the Amendment does not attempt to define inability in 
any way, Sections 3 and 4 provide two methods by which it may be 
determined.  Section 3 allows the President to inform Congress of his own 
volition that he is unable to exercise the powers of office for any reason at 
all and to designate the Vice President as Acting President.  The President, 
however, remains President.  Whenever the President wishes to resume the 
powers and duties of office, he or she merely informs Congress of this fact 
and the powers and duties automatically revert.15 
To date, Section 3 has been invoked on three occasions.  Most recently it 
was invoked by President George W. Bush in both 2007 and 2002 when he 
was about to undergo colonoscopies while under anesthesia.16  On both 
occasions, Vice President Cheney served briefly as Acting President.  It was 
also invoked in 1985 when President Reagan was about to undergo colon 
cancer surgery and designated Vice President George H.W. Bush as Acting 
President.17  Although Reagan initially stated that the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment was not applicable to instances such as the surgery he then 
faced, he nonetheless followed the form specified by Section 3 of the 
Amendment to the letter.18  Moreover, he later claimed that he had indeed 
invoked Section 3, writing that “Before they wheeled me into the operating 
 
 13. Carl Albert, A Voice in Naming Ford, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1973, at 10; Richard L. 
Madden, Ford’s Nomination Sent to Congress; He Bars ‘76 Race, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 
1973, at 1. 
 14. Gerald Ford, President of the United States, Remarks from the Oval Office, 
Washington, D.C. (Aug. 20, 1974), reprinted in Remarks by President and Rockefeller, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 21, 1974, at 25 (presenting Rockefeller to Congress as his vice presidential 
nominee). 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3. 
 16. See Letter from George W. Bush, President of the United States, to Rep. Nancy 
Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (July 21, 2007) (temporarily 
transferring power to the Vice President), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070721-5.html; Letter from George W. 
Bush, President of the United States, to Rep. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S. House of 
Representatives (July 21, 2007) (resuming power), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070721-8.html; Letter from George W. 
Bush, President of the United States, to Sen. Robert Byrd, President Pro Tempore of the U.S. 
Senate (June 29, 2002) (temporarily transferring power to the Vice President), available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020629-4.html; 
Letter from George W. Bush, President of the United States, to Sen. Robert Byrd, President 
Pro Tempore of the U.S. Senate (resuming power), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020629-2.html. 
 17. Texts of Reagan’s Letters, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1985, at 20; see also 131 CONG. 
REC. 19,008–09 (1985) (containing the text of President Reagan’s letter to Hon. Strom 
Thurmond, the President Pro Tempore of the U.S. Senate). 
 18. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Power Transfer Seen as Precedent, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 16, 1985, at 
A12; see also K.R. Crispell & Carlos Gomez, After Dinner Address to the American Clinical 
and Climatological Association:  Presidential Illness and the 25th Amendment (Oct. 21, 
1986), in 98 TRANSACTIONS AM. CLINICAL CLIMATOLOGICAL ASS’N 135, 142–43 (1987); 2 
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES:  RONALD REAGAN 1985, at 919 
(1988). 
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room, I signed a letter invoking the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, making 
George Bush Acting President during the time I was incapacitated under 
anesthesia.”19 
Unfortunately, Reagan reclaimed his powers and duties only nine hours 
after he passed them on to his Vice President, an unwise decision.  He later 
admitted that he awoke from surgery “somewhat confused.  I had an 
incision that ran up past my naval [sic] to my chest.  I was laced with tubes 
[and] very much a patient in for a stay.”20  Under these circumstances, 
Reagan would have been well-advised to allow Bush to continue to function 
as Acting President until his own recovery was more advanced.  If he had 
done so, his Administration might never have been stained by the Iran-
Contra scandal that apparently worsened during his hospitalization.21 
Fourth, Section 4 of the Amendment allows for involuntary transfers of 
power.  If the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet (or some other 
body created by Congress to act in place of the Cabinet) inform Congress 
that the President is unable to exercise the powers of his office, those 
powers pass to the Vice President who functions as Acting President.  
When the President indicates that he wishes those powers returned, he need 
only inform Congress of this fact and the powers are returned.  If the Vice 
President and Cabinet challenge the President, Congress must decide the 
matter within a maximum of twenty-three days.  A two-thirds vote in each 
house is needed for the Vice President to prevail.22  This Section—which 
pertains to the most difficult instances of disability—has never, to date, 
been invoked.23 
Although the Twenty-Fifth Amendment makes a number of major 
contributions to the constitutional order of the United States, it does not and 
almost certainly cannot definitively resolve all disability issues.  Terrorism, 
for example, poses new and expanded problems for both disability and 
succession as will later be addressed.  Another problem is that Presidents 
still remain reluctant to admit any serious inability because they fear that 
such an admission will lead to a lessening of their power and prestige.  This 
fear is not unwarranted.  
II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRESIDENTIAL ILLNESS 
The American people want their President to be strong and vibrant, not 
sick or feeble.  Strength or the illusion of strength bolsters leadership; 
weakness or the appearance of weakness undercuts it.  Since so many 
presidential illnesses have been concealed, contemporary observers might 
believe that illness has been a rare occurrence.  But physiological illness has 
been a close companion to the American presidency as history abundantly 
reveals. 
 
 19. RONALD REAGAN, AN AMERICAN LIFE 500 (1990). 
 20. RONALD REAGAN, THE REAGAN DIARIES 342 (Douglas Brinkley ed., 2007). 
 21. STEVEN F. HAYWARD, THE AGE OF REAGAN:  THE CONSERVATIVE 
COUNTERREVOLUTION 1980–1989, at 437 (2009).  
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
 23. See FEERICK, supra note 7, at 200. 
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President George Washington, in June 1789, experienced the growth of a 
large and painful tumor on his left thigh.  Surgery was performed to remove 
it and the President’s condition remained critical for several days.24  During 
this period, correspondence had to be handled by secretaries and almost two 
months elapsed before Washington fully resumed his responsibilities.25  In 
May 1790, he was stricken with influenza and perhaps pneumonia, and 
suffered from pulmonary difficulties.  For several days he appeared to be in 
danger of death.  Washington himself acknowledged the severe impact of 
these ailments, warning that if he experienced another serious illness, it 
would “‘put me to sleep with my fathers.’”26  In July 1791, a second tumor 
appeared on Washington’s leg, crippling him for a week and leaving him 
debilitated and exhausted for an extended period.27  By the end of his first 
term, he complained that he found the “fatigues of his position” to be 
“‘scarcely tolerable.’”28  During his second term, he experienced a 
quickening of memory loss29 and a cancer-like growth developed on the 
right side of his face.  The latter condition necessitated another surgery.30  
At the end of his eight year presidency, associates thought Washington 
looked ravaged. 
President John Adams suffered severe hand tremors during his second 
year in office and commented that his health was “‘sinking . . . under my 
Troubles and fatigues.’  ‘I . . . never shall be very well—certainly while in 
this office.’”  More serious, he appeared to show signs of emotional 
instability with several observers describing him as “mentally confused” 
and “irritable.”  Apparently in an effort to avoid a major breakdown, Adams 
left the capital when Congress was not in session and spent as much as two-
thirds of every year at his home in Quincy, Massachusetts.  This provoked 
sharp criticism that he was neglecting his duties.  Researchers have ascribed 
his erratic behavior to likely hyperthyroidism, a malady often related to 
stress.31 
President James Madison suffered a high fever, probably from malaria, in 
June 1813, that lasted for almost a month and led to long periods of 
delirium.  His lengthy absence from the scene resulted in the Senate’s 
rejection of one of his diplomatic appointments.32  His Secretary of State, 
James Monroe, wrote that the fever had “‘perhaps never left him, even for 
an hour, and occasionally symptoms have been unfavorable.’”33  This 
 
 24. JOSEPH J. ELLIS, HIS EXCELLENCY:  GEORGE WASHINGTON 190 (2004). 
 25. JOHN E. FERLING, THE FIRST OF MEN:  A LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 378 (1988). 
 26. ELLIS, supra note 24, at 190–91. 
 27. FERLING, supra note 25, at 411. 
 28. JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS & SUSAN DUNN, GEORGE WASHINGTON 94 (2004). 
 29. JAMES THOMAS FLEXNER, WASHINGTON:  THE INDISPENSABLE MAN 261 (1969). 
 30. ELLIS, supra note 24, at 221–22. 
 31. See, e.g., John Ferling & Lewis E. Braverman, John Adams’s Health Reconsidered, 
55 WM. & MARY Q. 83, 98, 104 (1998) (quoting letters from Adams to his wife, Abigail). 
 32. Michael P. Riccards, The Presidency:  In Sickness and in Health, 7 PRESIDENTIAL 
STUD. Q. 215, 219 (1977). 
 33. RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON:  A BIOGRAPHY 561 (1971). 
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illness was so severe and prolonged that it provoked discussions of 
presidential succession.34 
President James Monroe, in the winter of 1818, was bedridden with a 
fever and remained in a weakened condition for several weeks.  He did not 
receive visitors during this period and did not respond to messages.35  In 
August 1823, he suffered from an affliction of the central nervous system 
and experienced such severe convulsions that he was thought to be dying.  
For a period of time, he lapsed into unconsciousness.36 
President Andrew Jackson suffered throughout his presidency from 
excruciating headaches, shortness of breath, kidney disease, pulmonary 
hemorrhages, recurrent episodes of dysentery, and frequent stomachaches.37  
His feet and legs were badly swollen, leading to severe debility.38  He also 
suffered from the effects of bullets lodged in his body as a result of duels.  
One was deep in his left arm, causing persistent pain; another was located 
close to his heart and had infected his lungs.  He coughed continually, often 
spitting up blood.39 
President William Henry Harrison delivered an inaugural address that 
lasted an hour and forty minutes on a raw day and in a driving rainstorm.40  
He caught a cold that developed into pneumonia.  After a week, he seemed 
to improve but then suffered a relapse.  His condition was diagnosed as 
“‘bilious pleurisy, with symptoms of pneumonia and intestinal 
inflammation.’”41  Harrison gradually fell into a stupor, muttering 
helplessly in delirium.42  On April 4, only thirty days after taking the oath 
of office, he succumbed to his ailments.43  He was the first President to die 
in office, and his term thus far has been the shortest presidential term in 
American history. 
President Zachary Taylor experienced severe dizziness and headache on 
July 4, 1850 after attending several public ceremonies in the blazing heat of 
a Washington, D.C. summer.  Throughout the day, he had consumed large 
quantities of cherries, green apples, and ice-cold milk.  He developed 
symptoms of severe gastroenteritis, which initially did not cause alarm to 
the President, his aides, or the nation.44  Two days later, he was even able to 
 
 34. FEERICK, supra note 7, at 4–5. 
 35. HARRY AMMON, JAMES MONROE:  THE QUEST FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY 416 (1971); 
NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, JR., THE PRESIDENCY OF JAMES MONROE 142 (1996). 
 36. RUDOLPH MARX, THE HEALTH OF THE PRESIDENTS 85–86 (1960). 
 37. See id. at 103, 108–09, 114. 
 38. JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN LION:  ANDREW JACKSON IN THE WHITE HOUSE 123 
(2008). 
 39. DONALD B. COLE, THE PRESIDENCY OF ANDREW JACKSON 5 (1993). 
 40. MICHAEL A. GENOVESE, THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY:  1789–2000, at 
66 (2001). 
 41. NORMA LOIS PETERSON, THE PRESIDENCIES OF WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON & JOHN 
TYLER 41 (1989). 
 42. FREEMAN CLEAVES, OLD TIPPECANOE:  WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON AND HIS TIME 
342 (1939). 
 43. PETERSON, supra note 41, at 41. 
 44. K. JACK BAUER, ZACHARY TAYLOR:  SOLDIER, PLANTER, STATESMAN OF THE OLD 
SOUTHWEST 314–15 (1985). 
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go to his desk and sign several documents.  However, a severe infection—a 
malady referred to at the time as “cholera morbus”—was spreading rapidly 
through his body and his condition dramatically deteriorated.  After five 
days of general incapacitation, he was dead.45 
President Abraham Lincoln suffered from smallpox, scarlet fever, 
intermittent fevers and intense headaches during his presidency as well as 
having problems with digestion and poor blood circulation.46  Before his 
first term was even half over, one observer remarked that he had become a 
“grizzled, stooped figure, with ‘a sunken deathly look about the large, 
cavernous eyes.’”  As he began his second term, Lincoln was weary 
“beyond description” and took to his bed for several days.  He was so 
depleted that observers saw him as another “casualty of the war, ‘thin and in 
bad health.’”47  He admitted to associates that he was alarmed about his 
general health since his hands felt “‘cold and clammy.’”48  Some believe 
that he suffered from Marfan’s Syndrome, an unusual affliction of the 
bones, but doctors and scholars have yet to reach a conclusive diagnosis.49 
President James A. Garfield was shot by an assassin on July 2, 1881.  A 
bullet had entered Garfield’s body to the right of his spine and shattered his 
eleventh rib.  In an effort to locate the bullet, doctors probed the wound 
with their unwashed fingers, causing serious infection.50  Garfield 
underwent “numerous surgical drainages of abscesses; one was so extensive 
that it necessitated general anesthesia.”51  Unable to eat solid food, he 
hovered between life and death for eighty days, at times seeming to 
improve but then suffering relapses.52  During much of this period, he was 
unable to carry out his presidential responsibilities even though his 
physicians persisted in issuing optimistic bulletins about his condition.53  
Garfield died on September 19, 1881. 
President Chester A. Arthur—who succeeded Garfield in 1881—was 
diagnosed in 1882 as suffering from Bright’s disease, a serious and often 
fatal kidney ailment.  Arthur denied all rumors that he was seriously ill, 
despite the fact that the disease provoked spasmodic nausea, mental 
depression and fatigue.  Associates noticed that the President was often 
exhausted, irritable and physically ill.54  Within a year, the President had 
reduced his schedule sharply and his workday would begin as late as noon 
 
 45. BRAINERD DYER, ZACHARY TAYLOR 405–06 (1946). 
 46. DANIEL MARK EPSTEIN, THE LINCOLNS:  PORTRAIT OF A MARRIAGE 341, 461 (2008); 
MARX, supra note 36, at 181, 185; RONALD C. WHITE, JR., A. LINCOLN:  A BIOGRAPHY 609 
(2009). 
 47. RICHARD CARWARDINE, LINCOLN:  A LIFE OF PURPOSE AND POWER 223, 285 (2006). 
 48. DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 568 (1995). 
 49. MERRILL D. PETERSON, LINCOLN IN AMERICAN MEMORY 377 (1994). 
 50. ALLAN PESKIN, GARFIELD 595–97, 602–03 (1978). 
 51. IRA RUTKOW, JAMES A. GARFIELD 119 (2006). 
 52. See id. at 116–27 (describing the progress of President Garfield’s surgery and 
subsequent illness between July 26 and September 19, 1881). 
 53. JOHN M. TAYLOR, GARFIELD OF OHIO:  THE AVAILABLE MAN 273 (1970). 
 54. JUSTUS D. DOENECKE, THE PRESIDENCIES OF JAMES A. GARFIELD & CHESTER A. 
ARTHUR 80 (1981). 
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or one o’clock.55  At one point, he told his son that “I have been so ill . . . 
that I have hardly been able to dispose of the accumulation of business still 
before me.”56  In 1884, he did not make a serious bid to win his party’s 
nomination for another term and, quite ill, played no role in the ensuing 
campaign of the Republican presidential nominee, James Blaine.57  Less 
than two years after leaving office, Arthur died at the age of 56. 
President Grover Cleveland, in 1889, underwent two surgeries for cancer 
of the jaw, a condition possibly caused by his use of chewing tobacco.  
Because he wanted to keep his illness secret, the operations were performed 
not in a hospital but on board a yacht that traveled slowly up the East River.  
Despite severe hemorrhaging, Cleveland’s upper jaw was removed during 
an hour-long operation performed wholly within his mouth, a procedure 
that avoided any external scarring.58  Several weeks later and again on 
board the yacht, surgeons removed additional tissue and fitted him with an 
artificial rubber jaw to fill up the cavity created by the surgery and to 
improve his speech.59  Although Cleveland found the artificial jaw to be 
painful and uncomfortable, he learned to use it in order to speak clearly and 
forcefully.60  The White House announced only that the President had had a 
tooth extracted and denied anything more serious.  We did not learn of 
these procedures until 1917, twenty years after Cleveland left office and 
nine years after his death, when one of his surgeons revealed details in a 
newsmagazine article.61 
President William McKinley was shot by an anarchist on September 6, 
1901.  The bullet that struck him passed through his stomach, pancreas and 
a kidney and then buried itself in the muscles of his back.  An operation 
was performed quickly in order to suture the wounds in the President’s 
stomach and cleanse the peritoneal cavity.  Although the bullet was not 
located, McKinley seemed at first to improve and doctors reported that his 
status was “satisfactory.”62  After a week, however, his condition 
deteriorated and he became unable to take nourishment.  Also, his 
temperature rose ominously as a result of the gangrene that had spread 
along the bullet’s track.63  Drugs to control infection did not then exist and 
McKinley died in the early morning hours of September 14. 
President Woodrow Wilson, in the Fall of 1919, suffered two strokes, 
one massive, after campaigning vigorously for the League of Nations in the 
southwest.  The White House announced initially that the President was 
 
 55. FEERICK, supra note 7, at 10. 
 56. THOMAS C. REEVES, GENTLEMAN BOSS:  THE LIFE OF CHESTER ALAN ARTHUR 318 
(1991). 
 57. Id. at 387–88. 
 58. ALYN BRODSKY, GROVER CLEVELAND:  A STUDY IN CHARACTER 311–13 (2000). 
 59. JERROLD M. POST & ROBERT S. ROBINS, WHEN ILLNESS STRIKES THE LEADER:  THE 
DILEMMA OF THE CAPTIVE KING 7–9 (1993). 
 60. RICHARD E. WELCH, JR., THE PRESIDENCIES OF GROVER CLEVELAND 121 (1988). 
 61. W.W. Keen, The Surgical Operations on President Cleveland in 1893, SATURDAY 
EVENING POST, Sept. 22, 1917, at 24. 
 62. MARGARET LEECH, IN THE DAYS OF MCKINLEY 595–600 (1959). 
 63. H. WAYNE MORGAN, WILLIAM MCKINLEY AND HIS AMERICA 401–02 (2003). 
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suffering from “‘nervous exhaustion’” and that his condition was “‘not 
alarming.’”64  In truth, Wilson was completely paralyzed on his left side, 
his vision was permanently impaired and his speech was labored and 
indistinct.65  At first he was so ill that death seemed inevitable, but then he 
began to regain his strength—but very slowly.66  Too ill to meet with his 
Cabinet for seven months,67 Wilson served out his term as an incapacitated 
and broken man.  During this period, both the President of the United States 
and the government of the United States were paralyzed. 
President Warren G. Harding, in late July 1923, suffered a heart attack 
while traveling from Seattle to San Francisco.  One of his physicians feared 
for his life, certain that Harding had suffered a massive cardiovascular 
collapse.  The senior White House physician, however, announced to the 
press that the President was suffering from copper poisoning and that his 
condition was not serious.68  After Harding was put to bed in a San 
Francisco hotel room, medical personnel admitted that he was suffering 
from pneumonia, at the time a deadly malady.69  The President seemed to 
rally but then died suddenly four days later.  According to one of his White 
House physicians, the cause was a coronary occlusion.70 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt in March 1944 was diagnosed as 
suffering from moderately severe and advanced hypertension, obstructive 
pulmonary disease, and congestive heart failure.  His heart was grossly 
enlarged, the mitral valve was not closing properly and excessive pressure 
was being exerted on the aortic valve.71  His cardiologist believed that he 
might die at any moment, but with proper care he might live a year or 
two.72  The White House physician announced simply to the press that “‘the 
check up [was] satisfactory.  When we got through we decided that for a 
man of sixty-two we had very little to argue about.’”73  Thirteen months 
later, Roosevelt was dead. 
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President Dwight D. Eisenhower likely suffered a mild heart attack in 
April 1953, but the country was told that he had food poisoning.74  In 1955, 
he suffered another heart attack; the country was told initially that he had 
indigestion, that it “‘wasn’t serious; it is the kind of 24 hour stuff that many 
people have had.’”75  Later, it was announced that he had had a “mild” 
heart attack, then that it had been “moderate.”76  In fact, it had been massive 
and at least one of his cardiologists had doubts that he would survive.77  In 
1956, Eisenhower underwent abdominal surgery for ileitis, and in 1957, 
suffered a stroke.  In 1960, while campaigning for Nixon in Detroit, he 
experienced a severe case of ventricular fibrillation.  Instead of pumping 
blood, his heart simply vibrated.  Eisenhower’s White House physician saw 
his condition as “very dangerous” and the President cancelled plans to 
campaign further.78  No public announcement was ever made of this 
particular cardiac episode.79 
President John F. Kennedy experienced back problems that, according to 
one of his White House physicians, often resulted in almost unbearable 
pain.80  He also suffered from Addison’s disease, a failure of the adrenal 
glands.81  This condition required continuous medications but its very 
existence was denied by Kennedy and his associates.82  However, as early 
as 1953, a Lahey Clinic physician had described it “as the most serious of 
Kennedy’s many ailments.”83  One scholar has written, “Three prominent 
issues deserve consideration in any investigation into Kennedy’s life, 
health, and political behavior:  his debilitating back problems; his 
Addison’s disease; and, perhaps in response to the first two, his heavy 
reliance on medication, including steroids and amphetamines.”84 
President Lyndon Johnson, in 1965, underwent gallbladder surgery.  His 
doctors announced afterwards that he had come through the operation 
“beautifully as expected” and with no complications.  Thirty years later, one 
of Johnson’s White House physicians revealed to this author that during 
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surgery, the President suffered a potentially serious cardiac complication—
supraventricular tachycardia—which was detected and brought under 
control by attending physicians.85  No public announcement was ever made 
of this complication.  A year later, surgeons removed a sessile polyp from 
his right vocal cord and repaired a protrusion in his gallbladder incision by 
means of additional surgery.86  Recovery was slow and the President was 
unable to return to the White House for several weeks.87 
President Ronald Reagan was shot in 1981 by a would-be assassin.  
When he arrived at the George Washington University Medical Center, he 
had no recordable blood pressure, his left lung had collapsed and he had 
lost half of his body’s blood supply.88  According to his physicians, he was 
within five minutes of death.89  The White House emphasized that the 
President was telling jokes to his doctors, not that his condition was critical 
or that he was wholly incapable of exercising his powers.90  In 1985, 
Reagan underwent surgery for colon cancer in which a large cancerous 
growth was removed along with two feet of his intestines.91  In 1987, he 
underwent prostate surgery for the second time, did not bounce back 
quickly and had to follow a sharply reduced schedule, working only a few 
hours each day.92  His Chief of Staff saw him as being “in the grip of 
lassitude.”93  Reagan was so depleted that there was discussion of another 
invocation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.94 
The foregoing Presidents suffered from physiological illnesses, many of 
which were severe.  Other Presidents have suffered from psychological 
illnesses that were perhaps even more debilitating.  Although these latter 
ailments went undiagnosed at the time, they inflicted serious, if not 
devastating, damage to the presidencies of at least two men, Franklin Pierce 
(1853–1857) and Calvin Coolidge (1923–1929).  Pierce served just before 
the advent of the Civil War, a time of national agony.  Coolidge served just 
before the arrival of the Great Depression, a time of economic catastrophe.  
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Both men won decisive popular and electoral college victories.95  Neither 
man was able to respond to the crisis confronting him. 
III.  THE PRESIDENCY IN MOURNING:  FRANKLIN PIERCE 
The beginning of Franklin Pierce’s presidency was marked by personal 
and almost unimaginable tragedy.  Shortly before his inauguration, the 
President-elect and his wife were traveling by railroad with their eleven-
year-old son, Benny, from Andover to Concord, New Hampshire, Pierce’s 
home state.  Benny was the only surviving child of the three born to the 
couple.  Their first boy, Franklin, had died in infancy; their second, Frank 
Robert, had succumbed to typhus at the age of four.96  When that child had 
died, a newspaperman who was close to Pierce wrote that the boy’s death 
“was the greatest affliction that his father ha[d] experienced.”97  The 
tragedy that overwhelmed Benny was even more devastating to Pierce and 
his wife because he was their last child.98  Benny was the center of his 
parents’ lives and they doted on him.  Unfortunately, the train in which they 
were riding that winter day was derailed and plunged down a steep, twenty-
foot embankment, coming to rest on its roof.  When the slightly injured 
President-elect found Benny in the mangled wreckage, he discovered in 
horror that the back of his head had been torn off and that he was dead.99 
Pierce suffered deep feelings of guilt in the aftermath of his son’s death.  
Neither Benny nor Jane, the President-elect’s wife, had wanted him to 
become President.  When Pierce was nominated for that office, Benny had 
written to his mother, saying that “I hope he won’t be elected for I should 
not like to live at Washington and I know you would not either.”100  Jane 
Pierce surely did not.  She was opposed to her husband’s political 
ambitions, particularly when it meant living outside of New England.  
When she learned that he had been nominated for President, she was so 
upset that she fainted.101 
For his part, Pierce was prone to gloomy moods and to depression even 
before Benny’s death.  In his earlier political career, his moodiness had led 
him to succumb to alcoholism.  Excessive alcohol consumption leads to 
impaired judgment, blackouts and amnesia.102  Often Pierce would awaken 
from an alcoholic stupor “with a hangover of physical misery and mental 
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agony” while his wife would glare at him “with sad and reproachful 
eyes.”103  She finally convinced him to resign from the Senate in order to 
avoid the temptation of drinking to excess with colleagues and supporters.  
With his unexpected election to the presidency, she was convinced that he 
had betrayed her.  Much worse, with Benny’s death, she became deeply 
embittered that her husband’s presidency had been gained at the price of 
Benny’s life, and she could never fully forgive him for the boy’s sad fate. 
The death of his last child was a devastating blow to Pierce since it led to 
despondency, fears of personal inadequacy, and renewed drinking.  
According to Nichols: 
 It is difficult to express adequately the effect . . . [that] the tragedy 
worked upon the President-elect.  It became the fact of greatest 
importance in his life, troubling his conscience, unsettling him almost 
completely, and weakening his self-confidence for many months to come.  
At a time when he required peace and self-control for summoning all his 
powers to the big tasks awaiting him, he was distracted and worn by 
heart-searchings.  Burdened with a dead weight of hopeless sorrow, he 
entered his office fearfully.  He could not undertake its duties with that 
buoyant and confident assurance which so often in itself invites success. . 
. . [H]e was to work under a permanent handicap.  His was not a frame of 
mind to command success or to invite inspiration.  Much of the difficulty 
which he experienced in administration during the next four years may be 
attributed to this terrible tragedy and its long-continued after effects.104 
 During his entire tenure, Pierce confronted this “permanent handicap.”  
His latent sense of depression was dramatically heightened by the sudden 
loss of his son.  Just before the boy’s funeral, he wrote his wife—who was 
too upset to attend—that he was “‘overwhelmed with sorrow and a sense of 
loss which admits of no increase.’”105  He cancelled the Inaugural Ball and 
added a baleful introductory sentence to his Inaugural Address, proclaiming 
to the nation that:  “‘[I]t is a relief to feel that no heart but my own can 
know the personal regret and bitter sorrow over which I have been borne to 
a position so suitable for others rather than desirable for myself.’”106  Those 
who saw him even commented on his altered appearance and on his 
subdued behavior, very different from his earlier affability and charm.  His 
mood is perhaps best reflected in a letter that he wrote to an associate 
shortly after Benny’s death.  He told him: 
‘I presume you may already have heard of the terrible catastrophe upon 
the rail road, which took from us our only child, a fine boy 11 years old.  I 
am recovering rapidly from my bodily injuries, and Mrs. Pierce is more 
composed to day, tho’ very feeble and crushed to the earth by the fearful 
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bereavement. . . . How I shall be able to summon my manhood and gather 
up my energies for all the duties before me it is hard to see.’107 
 Virtually at no time during his presidency was Pierce’s wife able to 
provide him with comfort since she, too, was overwhelmed by grief.  A shy, 
retiring woman, she had never enjoyed—and frequently refused to 
participate in—social events.108  But the death of her third child “virtually 
destroyed what was left of Jane’s health and mental stability.”109  On the 
day that Benny was killed, a fellow passenger on the ill-fated train had 
commented that Mrs. Pierce’s “‘agony passes beyond any description.’”110  
Time did not much heal her pain and she did little more than reinforce her 
husband’s deep despondency.  After refusing to attend his Inauguration, she 
resided for many months in bitter mourning as a recluse in New Hampshire.  
At social events in Washington, she was replaced at her husband’s side by 
the wives and daughters of Cabinet members.  Even after she finally moved 
into the White House in 1855, she remained morose and withdrawn.  One 
commentator suggests that she “was never seen to smile again” and that she 
remained secluded in her room, “scribbling pitiful little notes to her dead 
boy.”111  When she did agree to put in appearances on social occasions, her 
demeanor would be grim.  After one such occasion, an observer wrote in his 
diary, “‘[e]verything in that mansion seems cold and cheerless.  I have seen 
hundreds of log cabins which contained more happiness.’”112 
The Pierce Administration was affected greatly by the President’s grief.  
Professors Jonathan R.T. Davidson and Kathryn M. Connor write that it is 
likely that Pierce’s “mental anguish influenced the manner in which he 
chose his inner cabinet and his style of leadership.”113  Essentially, he 
decided to institute cabinet government, with the President serving as a 
member of the governing body but not as its leader.  This was problematic 
since the members of Pierce’s Cabinet were weak.  None had much political 
expertise, and they were unable to provide the sound advice so badly 
needed.  Cabinet members saw their role largely as being cheerleaders for 
the President and trying to boost his depleted spirits.  To make matters 
worse, Pierce himself was so depressed and dejected that he was unable to 
provide firm direction and guidance to the group.  The sense of malaise that 
suffused the executive branch was overpowering.114 
Moreover, Pierce so deeply needed human sympathy that he found it 
very difficult to alienate visitors by refusing whatever it was that they 
wanted.  Therefore, either he offered immediate agreement with their 
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requests or else “took refuge in a cordial indefiniteness that was frequently 
interpreted as an affirmative.  When his decision finally was made in the 
negative, he was accused of lying and hated as a deceiver.”115  Although 
this troubled the President, he was unable to change his behavior. 
Much more serious, Pierce was absorbed by the minutiae of his 
Administration while the more serious and pressing problems confronting 
him were largely ignored.  He met with his Cabinet for two hours every 
day, essentially to discuss patronage issues.  He encouraged his assistants to 
bring him a great number of minor matters, investigated complaints coming 
to him in the mail, and often kept his door open to the public.  At the same 
time, “[t]he larger problems slid by little touched by Presidential power:  
trouble in Cuba, Mexico, and Central America; ailing relations with 
England; Kansas torn and bleeding.”116 
Not surprisingly, newspapers gave Pierce very bad press, unleashing a 
constant stream of vituperation against him.  He was often attacked for 
being weak, vacillating, and naïve.  The New York Herald, for example, 
carried a series of condescending articles repeatedly describing the 
President to its readers as “poor pierce.”117  The London Times, an 
influential British newspaper, raised questions about “the sobriety and good 
sense” of the President soon after his inauguration and later criticized him 
for his “moral prostration.”118  As antagonism between northern and 
southern states intensified, many southern newspapers saw Pierce as 
duplicitous and untrustworthy while many northern newspapers regarded 
him as something of a traitor. 
Professor Michael A. Genovese suggests that “Pierce was probably the 
last president who might have been able to prevent the Civil War.”119  But 
the rising sectional animosities called for decisive leadership from the 
White House, and Pierce was unable to provide it.  He largely sought to 
defuse, rather than confront, slavery as a political issue.120  Consequently, 
he was seen by the northern states as having surrendered abjectly to the 
South.121  Confronted by Pierce’s weakness, an ascendant Congress took on 
the primary responsibility for attempting to resolve this emotional and 
divisive national problem.122  Within a short time, the nation was plunged 
into a civil war in which over 600,000 perished.123 
The fact that Pierce was distracted by his grief and anesthetized by the 
alcohol consumed to cope with it created a leadership vacuum at a time of 
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great national crisis.  John Forney, the clerk of the House of 
Representatives, wrote in a letter to James Buchanan, who would succeed 
Pierce in the Presidency:  “‘The place overshadows him.  He is crushed by 
its great duties and he seeks refuge in [alcohol].  His experience convinces 
me that a great mistake was made in putting him in at all.’”124 
Although he had initially promised not to seek a second term,125 Pierce 
changed his mind after consulting his Cabinet on the issue.  He was certain 
that he would win the nomination but after fourteen unsuccessful ballots, 
withdrew his name from further consideration.  This rejection by his party 
added to his depressed mood since he saw it as a personal repudiation.  
From beginning to end, his presidency was an unhappy one. 
It cannot be said with certainty, however, that Pierce’s depression was 
wholly responsible for his indecisive and lackadaisical presidency.  Even 
before his son’s death, he had been an undistinguished leader.  Pierce had 
achieved little as a member of the Senate where his work was negatively 
affected by his alcoholism.  However, Benny’s death seems to have 
exacerbated all of his deficiencies.  It remained always as a looming 
presence in his life, “troubling his conscience, unsettling him almost 
completely, and weakening his self-confidence.”126  It also led to renewed 
and excessive drinking.  After he left office, he was asked what he would 
then do.  He allegedly replied, “‘there’s nothing left . . . but to get 
drunk.’”127 
Professor Roy Franklin Nichols, however, offers a more favorable 
assessment of what might have come about in the Pierce Administration if 
young Benny had not been killed.  He writes: 
Had he entered the White House with the confidence which his great 
victory should have supplied, and been able to live a happy, normal 
family life, with his nervous system unshaken and, as hitherto, resilient, it 
may at least be wondered whether he might not have risen to the 
challenge of the Presidency.  He was only forty-eight, in the prime of life, 
enjoying a zenith which should have still afforded much capacity for 
further development and maturing of power.128 
Whether or not Nichols’s positive view is justified, the fact remains that 
Benny’s death was a devastating blow to Pierce’s somewhat unstable 
personality.  As President, he was almost guaranteed to fail.  Not 
surprisingly, contemporary scholars view him as having been among the 
worst of Presidents.  The historians and political scientists who participated 
in the 1995 Ridings-McIver survey, for example, ranked Pierce 35th out of 
the thirty-nine Presidents evaluated.129  He had had little influence on 
Congress, his foreign policy had often been determined by his Cabinet 
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without any leadership from him, and his presidential vacillation had paved 
the way to the Civil War.  As one scholar has written, “[i]n light of 
subsequent events, the Pierce administration can be seen only as a disaster 
for the nation.”130 
IV.  THE PRESIDENCY IN MOURNING:  CALVIN COOLIDGE 
The case of Calvin Coolidge is equally tragic but at the same time, quite 
different.  Despite his image now as a lazy and negligent president, 
Coolidge had always been seen earlier as industrious and reliable.  As a 
Mayor, a state legislator, President of the Massachusetts Senate, Governor 
of the Commonwealth, and Vice President of the United States, he 
impressed others with his diligence, conscientiousness and competence.  
When he became President in August 1923 following the death of Warren 
Harding, he showed these same qualities, moving quickly and strongly to 
take charge of the executive office and stamp it with his own personality.131 
Although he had been known informally for years as “Silent Cal,” 
Coolidge quickly succeeded in mastering the “new politics of public 
opinion.”132  He instituted regular meetings with the press and his 
impressive facility at answering questions at his first press conference—
showing that he was fully informed and involved—elicited an ovation from 
reporters.133  Also, the new President invited Congressmen and Senators of 
all political predispositions to breakfasts and dinners at the White House so 
that he could develop a congenial relationship with them and build support 
for his programs.  Showing clear boldness, he pardoned thirty individuals 
who had been convicted and imprisoned for violating the Sedition Act 
during World War I because he wanted to please the members of Congress 
who supported clemency.134  This action was taken over the strong 
opposition of the American Legion, which did not favor forgiveness.  He 
summoned the governors of all the states to the White House so that he 
could get their thinking on the narcotics, immigration and prohibition laws 
and acquaint them with his own views.135  He appointed a two-person 
committee to investigate the scandals associated with the Harding 
Administration and announced forthrightly that “‘if there is any guilt it will 
be punished; if there is any civil liability, it will be enforced; if there is any 
fraud, it will be revealed; if there are any contracts which are illegal, they 
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will be canceled.’”136  He then demanded and received the resignation of 
Harry Daugherty, Harding’s controversial attorney general, who was 
suspected of wrongdoing. 
In the international realm, Coolidge impressed the world shortly after 
becoming President by dispatching the Pacific fleet to Japan in order to help 
that nation recover from a catastrophic earthquake that had killed some 
130,000 people.  In taking this step, he had acted so quickly that the U.S. 
fleet had arrived on the scene even before the Japanese ships did.137  Closer 
to home, he moved aggressively to improve diplomatic relations with 
Mexico, a neighboring nation he described with great respect as “our sister 
Republic.”  In an act pleasing to the Mexicans, he requested that Congress 
provide funds to resolve claims flowing from the U.S. invasion in 1914.138 
Above all, the most striking thing that Coolidge did during his early days 
as President was to deliver a powerful State of the Union address to 
Congress in December 1923.  Contrary to most Presidents of his era, he did 
not send his speech to be read to legislators by clerks but rather delivered it 
in person to a joint session.  In this important address, he made some forty 
specific requests in very direct language, beginning with a warning to 
Congress that “[o]ur National Government is not doing as much as it 
legitimately can do to promote the welfare of the people.”139  He then 
proceeded to recommend a tax cut and a litany of other measures that were 
designed to reverse this situation.  Among these, he requested the creation 
of a separate cabinet-level department of education and welfare, the 
expansion of health benefits for veterans, the enactment of environmental 
legislation, a broadening of the civil service system, the passage of a 
constitutional amendment limiting child labor, the creation of a new 
reforestation policy, the establishment of reformatories for women and 
young men serving their first prison sentence, the funding of medical 
courses at Howard University, the reorganization of the U.S. Foreign 
Service and the establishment of a permanent Court of International 
Justice.140  He also proclaimed that the rights of black people were “just as 
sacred as those of any other citizen” and called on Congress to “exercise all 
its powers . . . against the hideous crime of lynching.”141 
By the end of the legislative session in June 1924, many of Coolidge’s 
proposals had largely been enacted.  Taxes were reduced, veterans’ benefits 
were increased, an oil slick law was passed, reformatories for women and 
young men were authorized, a new reforestation policy was established and 
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the Foreign Service was reorganized.  Coolidge’s legislative record in his 
first year as President, then, was clearly impressive.142 
It is not surprising that Calvin Coolidge was overwhelmingly nominated 
for President of the United States at the Republican National Convention in 
June 1924.  In addition to his strong performance as a leader in his first year 
in the White House, he had conducted an adept pre-Convention campaign 
that saw him easily outmaneuver and overwhelm his several intra-party 
challengers.  This was the greatest political triumph he had ever 
experienced.  Within days, however, his world—and his life—would fall 
apart.143 
On June 30, Coolidge’s two sons, eighteen-year-old John and sixteen-
year-old Calvin Jr., played tennis on the South Grounds of the White 
House.  The younger boy, Coolidge’s favorite, had been so anxious to play 
that he wore sneakers but no socks.  A blister developed on one of his toes 
but he continued to play and played for several hours on the next day as 
well.  On July 2, the boy did not feel well.  When White House physician 
Joel Boone examined him, he became alarmed.  The blister on the third toe 
of his right foot was about the size of the doctor’s thumbnail and much 
darker in color than normal.  Boone became even more alarmed when he 
saw red streaks extending up the boy’s leg.144  A series of laboratory tests 
soon disclosed that Calvin Jr. had a serious staph infection and was stricken 
with pathogenic blood poisoning.145 
Doctors fought for several days to save the boy’s life.  He was 
hospitalized and the President and First Lady moved into the hospital to be 
close to his bedside.  On the evening of July 7, Dr. Albert Kolmer, one of 
the boy’s physicians, told Coolidge that his son was rapidly dying.  Kolmer 
later reported that the President became hysterical, taking his son into his 
arms and shouting that he would soon join him and the President’s mother 
in death.  Kolmer described this episode as “the most touching and heart-
rending experience of my whole professional career.”146 
Calvin Jr. died at 10:20 that night.  The boy’s body was taken to the 
White House where it lay in state and where crowds of Washington 
officialdom paid their last respects.  Dr. Boone later reported that after 
young Calvin’s wake had ended, the President came downstairs from the 
White House living quarters dressed in a bathrobe and stood beside his 
son’s open casket, gazing at his face and gently stroking his hair.147 
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In 1997, John Coolidge, Calvin Coolidge’s surviving son, provided this 
author with some personal observations about his father.  He told me that 
on the day following his brother’s wake, when the casket had been closed in 
preparation for funeral services in Northampton and then Vermont, the 
President had broken down in tears, sobbing, “They’re taking our boy 
away.”148  He said that this was the only time in his life that he had seen his 
father cry.  He also shared with me that the long-term impact of Calvin Jr.’s 
death on his father was enormous.  His overall assessment was that “my 
father was never the same again.”149 
After the funeral, the First Lady, aides, friends, and his own father tried 
to console the President but to no avail.  Visitors to his office reported that 
he wept openly as he spoke of his son, saying again and again that he 
couldn’t believe what had happened.  He indicated that every time he 
looked out the window, he saw his son playing tennis on the courts outside.  
One of Coolidge’s friends described his face as having “‘the bleak 
desolation of cold November rain beating on gray Vermont granite.’”150  
Although Grace Coolidge told her friends that her son was at rest and that 
she had emerged from his funeral with a “peace which passeth 
understanding,” the President clearly was not at peace, and the buoyant 
First Lady was unable to extricate him from his personal anguish.151 
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) and the National Institutes 
of Health have specified symptoms of a major depressive episode.  These 
include hypersomnia or insomnia, changes in appetite, feelings of guilt, 
indecisiveness, recurrent thoughts of death, the loss of interest in nearly all 
activities, increased irritability, decreased energy, complaints of bodily 
indispositions, spitefulness, suspiciousness, and deterioration in work 
performance.152  An analysis of Calvin Coolidge’s behavior patterns after 
his son’s death reveals distinctly the presence of all of these symptoms.  As 
a result, he and his presidency changed profoundly. 
He began to eat compulsively and suffered frequent abdominal pain.  He 
complained often of exhaustion and began to sleep fifteen hours out of 
every twenty-four.  He experienced feelings of severe guilt, writing 
pointedly that “if I had not been President he would not have raised a blister 
on his toe . . . playing lawn tennis in the South Grounds.”153  Coolidge also 
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began to speak about his own death despite the fact that he was only fifty-
two years old at the time.  In December 1925, for example, he wrote his 
father and told him that soon they would both be reunited in death with 
deceased relatives, including his mother and young Calvin,154 both of 
whom he had idolized. 
Often he complained of feeling ill, of having severe indigestion and 
being unable to breathe.  Intensely irritable, he would fly into rages, 
frequently for reasons that were insignificant or inconsequential.  His 
wife—whom he once suspected of becoming romantically involved with a 
Secret Service agent—was often the victim of his severe temper tantrums 
and was deeply embarrassed at his explosive tirades, occasionally in the 
presence of others.155  To John Coolidge, his only surviving child, he was 
argumentative, rude, and mean-spirited, leading the offended young man to 
complain to his mother that he did not understand how she could possibly 
tolerate the President’s bad behavior.156 
Of greater importance was that Coolidge largely abandoned his 
presidential responsibilities after his beloved son died.  He reduced greatly 
his interactions with Congress, made few and comparatively minor 
legislative requests and suggested that Congress, in light of its closeness to 
the people, should determine the legislative agenda for the country.  After 
his memorable 1923 Address, he did not deliver his Annual Messages to 
Congress in person but rather allowed them to be read to the two Houses by 
clerks.  Moreover, the content of these post-1923 Messages was wholly 
inconsequential when compared with that of his first Annual Address.157  
Further, he drew back from interactions with his own Cabinet, telling 
Cabinet members to handle the affairs of their own departments without 
help or guidance from him.  If they failed to do so, he threatened to dismiss 
them.158  
Although he had previously established an unmistakable record for hard 
work, his presidential workday now shrank to about four hours.  No longer 
was he seen as a “hog for work” or a “workhorse” as he had often been 
described before.159  Also, his interest in foreign policy waned dramatically; 
on one occasion, he informed his secretary of state that “‘I don’t know 
anything about this . . . and you’re in charge.  You settle the problem, and 
I’ll back you up.’”160  His press conferences, once so impressive and 
informative that they provoked applause, now showcased his neglectful and 
lackadaisical leadership style.  In November 1924, for example, he was 
asked a question about Nicaragua where American troops had long been 
stationed in an effort to maintain peace.  He replied: 
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I haven’t any very great detailed and precise information about 
[Nicaragua].  I knew that there had been some trouble and it was my 
impression that we had sent some Marines in to guard the Legation, and 
that the difficulty was in relation to a presidential election.  As I have 
heard nothing about it from the State Department for some time I had 
taken it for granted that the situation was cleared up.  I think that is the 
case, but I haven’t any definite information.161 
On another occasion, he was questioned about agriculture bills being 
considered in Congress.  His answer was frank but at the same time 
thoroughly revealing of an absentee President:  “I don’t know as I can make 
any particular comment about the rejection of the Conference agricultural 
bill.  I don’t know enough about the details of these bills to discuss the 
details with any intelligence.”162 
More catastrophic, as the economy became increasingly unstable, 
Coolidge took no action to stem the disturbing tide.  Instead, his press 
conference remarks revealed a shocking degree of disinterest and ignorance 
about the tumultuous stock speculation that was reverberating throughout 
the economy.  As an example, when Congress, in 1928, was considering 
legislation intended to rein in and tame such speculation, Coolidge 
expressed his great disinterest in the matter, announcing to the press that “I 
have no information relative to proposed legislation about loans on 
securities.  I saw by the press there was a bill pending in the House or the 
Senate.  I don’t know what it is or what the provisions of it are, or what the 
discussion about it has been.”163  When Commerce Secretary Herbert 
Hoover personally begged him to intervene in order to cool down the 
overheated economy, Coolidge summarily rejected his entreaties.  The 
President was simply impervious to the nation’s economic problems and 
unable to see the dangers that they posed.164  This was tragic since even 
“words from the president might have helped check the practice of 
[speculative credit].”165  But instead, the words Coolidge spoke were 
indefinite, indifferent, or even counterproductive. 
Such behavior has long been seen as the sign of an incompetent and 
negligent Chief Executive.  But considering his first successful year as 
President and his impressive earlier political career, and noting the other 
behavioral changes that engulfed his life after July 7, 1924, what really had 
emerged here was a disabled President, one suffering from a paralyzing and 
persistent clinical depression.  This illness was little understood in the 
1920s but those closest to Coolidge noticed a major change in his behavior 
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after young Calvin died.  His surviving son described him as having been 
decimated by the loss.  His wife indicated that the President had lost his 
“zest for living” as a result of the boy’s death.166  Coolidge’s White House 
physician described him as showing many signs of “a little disturbance” and 
of “temperamental derangement.”  His secretary told his doctors that the 
president was definitely showing signs of “mental sickness.”  The chief 
usher at the White House reported that White House employees who came 
in contact with the president noticed that he was “highly disturbed.”167  
Coolidge himself explained the change in his presidency perhaps best of all 
when he wrote in his autobiography that “when [Calvin Jr.] went, the power 
and the glory of the Presidency went with him.”168  In a very real sense, 
then, a personal loss had become a national tragedy. 
Back in Coolidge’s day, prominent journalists debunked his presidency.  
One complained that Coolidge “was ‘distinguishable from the furniture 
only when he moved’”; another suggested that his “‘chief feat during five 
years and seven months’ in the White House ‘was to sleep more than any 
other president’”; another claimed that Coolidge “had ‘cut the umbilical 
cord between thought and speech.’”169  In addition, when one illustrious 
writer was told in January 1933 that Coolidge had died, she replied, “‘How 
could they tell?’”170  
Contemporary scholars are similarly negative.  One complains that 
“Coolidge voluntarily abdicated the leadership which the Constitution 
intended that the chief executive should exercise.”171  Another writes that 
he is “the weakest of modern day weak Presidents,”172 and still another 
jokes that he “succeeded in his ambition to be ‘the least President’ the 
United States ever had.”173  In published scholarly works, Coolidge is 
referred to as a “figurehead,”174 as having had no drive,175 as having 
presided over a “do-nothing Presidency,”176 as having been a President 
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“almost totally deficient in powers of leadership,”177 and as 
“lackadaisical.”178  Overall, the Ridings-McIver Survey ranked Coolidge 
31st out of thirty-nine Presidents evaluated, just two places above William 
Henry Harrison who had died after only thirty days in office.179 
V.  THE CHALLENGES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ILLNESS 
Coolidge’s psychological breakdown was an intractable problem in his 
time—just as it was in Pierce’s—and would continue to pose great stress 
for the political system today.  In part, this is because mental illness is so 
often misunderstood.  Surveys taken in the 1990s disclosed that some sixty-
five percent of respondents saw “a lot of stigma” surrounding mental illness 
while only six percent did not.180  Other studies have shown that many 
people are convinced that serious psychiatric disorders are brought about 
“by sin or weakness of character.”181  Although attitudes may have softened 
somewhat in more recent years, the public still remains quite unsettled with 
regard to psychological afflictions.  This would make it very difficult for a 
President to admit that he or she was suffering from such an illness.  
Consonant with Professor Richard E. Neustadt’s innovative theory, such an 
admission would incalculably diminish the President’s “professional 
reputation” and “public prestige,” thereby damaging his overall 
“presidential power.”182 
The public is disconcerted by the thought that its leader might be 
psychologically impaired.  In 1957, for example, after President 
Eisenhower suffered a mild stroke, several newspapers—fearing cognitive 
impairment—urged that he resign the presidency.183  They had made no 
such recommendation after he suffered a massive heart attack in 1955.  
Thirty years later, Michael Dukakis’ presidential campaign was badly 
injured when rumors circulated that he had received treatment for an 
alleged psychological disorder.  President Ronald Reagan further damaged 
Dukakis’ standing by referring to him publicly as “an invalid.”184  Although 
the rumors were wholly false and Reagan’s remark quite unfair, Dukakis 
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dropped sharply in the polls since many voters were unwilling to entrust the 
Presidency to a candidate who might be psychologically unsound.185 
Even if the Twenty-Fifth Amendment had been ratified prior to the 
Pierce and Coolidge eras, it is highly unlikely that either Sections 3 or 4 of 
the Amendment would have been invoked in the case of either President.  
Clinical depression is often difficult to diagnose and some of its symptoms 
might well suggest a physiological rather than psychological illness.  For 
example, sufferers often experience pains of various kinds and complain of 
physical discomfort.  It is unlikely that either Pierce or Coolidge would 
have recognized the existence of a psychological disorder.  Close associates 
of the two men might have suspected presidential impairment of some 
sort—Coolidge’s certainly did—but would not likely have gone public with 
their suspicions since, outwardly at least, the President seemed to be well 
and capable of functioning.  After all, reporters in each instance had 
commented on the President’s passivity, weakness, or incompetence but 
they did not suspect psychological illness and never suggested that it may 
have existed. 
Whether Pierce’s physician would have diagnosed depression in his case 
rather than a simple continuation of previous poor performance cannot now 
be known.  If, however, the physicians of either Pierce or Coolidge had 
privately advised key officials (e.g., those next in the line of succession) 
that the Chief Executive in question was suffering from a severe depressive 
episode and, therefore, was disabled, it would have been very difficult for 
those officials to go public with such a diagnosis because the illness was not 
well understood and it would have been very difficult to demonstrate its 
existence.  If the Cabinet of either President had been approached about the 
diagnosis, its likely reactions would have been confusion and uncertainty.  
Rather than taking steps to invoke Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, it might well have rebuked high-ranking officials for 
disloyalty to the President or for excessive ambition.  The political careers 
of these officials might have come to an end, particularly if the President 
was made aware of their  perceived treachery. 
Even at the present time, it is frequently difficult to diagnose clinical 
depression and to differentiate this disorder from other types of depressive 
illness.  Trained clinicians regularly fail to recognize depressive syndromes.  
Moreover, deeply bereaved persons are often unwilling to discuss their grief 
and resent any suggestions that they are ill or suffering from a 
psychological disorder.  As Fran Schumer writes, “Grief, after all, is 
noble—emblematic of the deep love between parents and children, spouses 
and even friends.  Our sorrows, the poets tell us, make us human.”186  
Therefore, the bereaved may well—and may easily—conceal their true 
feelings or even their symptoms and may put on a deceptively happy face.  
Larry E. Beutler and Mary L. Malik point out that “[a]s few as 10% of 
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syndromally depressed patients may be detected by primary care providers, 
and as few as 30% of such patients are detected by psychiatrists, even after 
they are systematically trained to recognize it.”187 
The problem of diagnosis is further compounded by the fact that “new” 
psychiatric conditions occasionally appear and take their place in the 
psychiatric firmament.  As an example, “prolonged grief disorder” is 
currently being studied by the American Psychiatric Association and may 
be added to its handbook for diagnosing mental disorders, Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual V,188 now scheduled to be published in 2013.  If declared 
a mental illness, prolonged grief disorder will differ somewhat from clinical 
depression in its etiology, symptoms, and effects but the differences 
between the two conditions will not be easy for laymen to understand.  
Even among mental health practitioners, serious disagreements will almost 
certainly occur.  When determining presidential disability, such 
disagreement among “the experts” would be likely to immobilize rather 
than expedite the process. 
In this respect, it may be useful to recall that in addition to Franklin 
Pierce and Calvin Coolidge, still another President suffered the loss of a 
child during his presidency.  In February 1862, Abraham Lincoln saw his 
beloved son, eleven-year old Willie, die of typhoid fever.  The boy’s brief 
illness had been a time of agony for the President, and the ensuing death 
plunged him into deep depression.  This was the second child that Lincoln 
had lost; in 1850, his son Eddie had died and he had taken the loss badly.  
Willie’s death, coming in the midst of the Civil War, simply overwhelmed 
him with grief.  When he told his secretary that young Willie had died, 
Lincoln was choked with emotion and burst into tears, sobbing that his son 
was “gone—actually gone!”  To a visitor, Lincoln lamented, “[m]y poor 
boy.  He was too good for this earth . . . but then we loved him so.”189  “‘It 
is hard, hard to have him die,’” he said as he “‘buried his head in his hands . 
. . and his tall frame was convulsed with emotion.’”190 
This was no temporary sadness; Lincoln’s despondency was persistent 
and enduring.  On many occasions, he referred to Willie’s death, saying, 
“This is the hardest trial of my life.”191  One observer remarked that “I 
never saw a man so bowed down with grief.”192  Speaking to an associate, 
Lincoln confided “That blow overwhelmed me; it showed me my weakness 
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as I had never felt it before.”193  Long after the boy died, the President 
would occasionally begin to weep.  At the war’s end, he told his wife, “We 
must both be more cheerful in the future; between the war and the loss of 
our darling Willie, we have been very miserable.”194 
The First Lady had indeed been deeply distressed by her young son’s 
death.  Immediately after the event, she had taken to her bed and remained 
there for several weeks, although largely unable to sleep.  Never again did 
she enter the room where the boy had succumbed to his illness or the Green 
Room at the White House where his body had reposed before burial.  For 
many months, she remained in deep mourning and even was regarded as 
hovering on the brink of a nervous breakdown.  Because she was so 
distraught, she was unable to provide her husband with much 
encouragement or support.195  Both the President and First Lady were 
emotionally stricken and emotionally isolated for a lengthy period. 
Like Pierce, Lincoln had been subject to bouts of depression in his earlier 
life.  In fact, several of his biographers write that he suffered on a long-term 
basis from a depressive melancholy, a condition that is “an aspect of 
temperament, perhaps genetically based.”  The condition was observed by 
many of his associates, including his law partner who once remarked that 
“his melancholy dript from him as he walked.”196  As President, Lincoln 
showed the same somber and downcast demeanor, but after February 1862, 
it was intensified as he mourned for his son. 
Some commentators suggest that one source of strength for Lincoln 
throughout this ordeal was his faith in God.  Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. 
maintains that “[o]f all our American presidents, Lincoln had the most acute 
religious insight.  Though not enrolled in any denomination, he brooded 
over the infinite mystery of the Almighty.”197  The bond between Lincoln 
and the Almighty fortified his resolve and gave him confidence that he 
could continue to take on the great challenges of his office.  In a very real 
sense, he saw himself “as an instrument of God’s will.”198  The death of his 
young son was always with him but his sense of God-given responsibility 
remained with him as well. 
Despite suffering the same terrible loss that had afflicted both Pierce and 
Coolidge, Lincoln’s overall performance as President of the United States 
was outstanding, and he is now ranked as being among the greatest of all 
Presidents.  Today’s scholars are overwhelmingly positive about him in 
their judgments.  One, for example, writes that Lincoln’s “great 
accomplishment was to energize and mobilize the nation by affirming its 
better angels, by showing the nation at its best.”199  Another suggests that 
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Lincoln was “neither a revolutionary nor a dictator, but a constitutionalist 
who used the executive power to preserve and extend the liberty of the 
American Founding.”200  Still another explained that Lincoln’s greatness 
sprang from the fact that he “insisted that the Union was, and should 
remain, unbroken.”201  Perhaps the most perceptive comment of all about 
Lincoln is that he was a figure “in whom intense suffering coexisted with 
great achievement,” showing that “illness can coexist with marvelous well-
being.”202  The Ridings-McIver Survey, so harsh to Pierce and Coolidge, 
places Lincoln 1st among the thirty-nine Presidents evaluated.203 
One can easily imagine how difficult it would have been for both 
physicians and public officials to examine the Pierce, Coolidge, and 
Lincoln experiences in private and then try to decide in which cases, if any, 
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment should be invoked.  Depression 
of some sort seems to have been present in all three men.  Section 4 might 
well have been invoked in Coolidge’s case because his political behavior 
seems clearly to have changed for the worse in response to his young son’s 
death.  Invocation in Pierce’s case might have been justified, but the 
underlying cause of his poor performance in the White House may well 
have been incompetence and ineptitude rather than depressive illness.  
Invocation of Section 4 in Lincoln’s case would have been wholly 
unjustified and extraordinarily unwise; Lincoln led brilliantly.  Despite his 
grief and depression, he emerged as one of the most effective leaders in our 
history.  It would have been foolhardy to cut Lincoln’s term short and thrust 
Vice President Hannibal Hamlin onto the nation in 1862.  Yet diagnostic 
imprecision and erroneous prognoses might well have produced this tragic 
outcome.  They might well do so even today. 
Diagnostic difficulties extend far beyond interpreting various types of 
depressive illness.  The same difficulty exists, for example, in 
differentiating schizoaffective disorders not only from each other but also 
from other psychological disturbances.  Psychiatrist Michael Green 
comments that “one of the hardest aspects of making a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia is making sure it’s not something else.”204  He explains that 
“schizophrenia can look like (1) mania in its active phase, (2) depression 
with psychotic features, (3) certain forms of drug abuse, (4) extreme 
obsessive compulsive disorder, and (5) posttraumatic stress disorder, just to 
name a few.”205  Donald W. Goodwin and his colleague, Samuel B. Guze, 
agree that the process for differentiating mental illnesses is highly 
complex, writing that “such labels as schizophrenia . . . and nonremitting 
schizophrenia are used to refer to the poor-prognosis cases, whereas 
schizophreniform, acute schizophrenia, reactive schizophrenia, 
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schizoaffective, and remitting schizophrenia are used for the good-
prognosis cases.”206  Significantly, these various illnesses affect patients to 
varying degrees and in quite different ways. 
Schizophrenia (a poor-prognosis case) is a serious mental illness that 
persists for at least half a year and is characterized by marked social and 
occupational impairment.  It is one of the leading causes of disability 
throughout the world.  However, schizophreniform disorder (a good-
prognosis case) is a milder illness characterized by schizophrenia-type 
symptoms of shorter duration.  It does not necessarily entail any decline in 
social and occupational functioning.207  This is an important distinction, 
especially since the level of impairment is a key consideration when 
invocations of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment are being considered.  
Whether diagnosticians would always be able to differentiate accurately 
between these conditions, even if they recognize that one of them surely 
exists, is doubtful. 
Professor Rose McDermott writes, “Coping with the effects of mental 
illness in a leader can prove extremely challenging, especially as it is often 
insidious in onset and intermittent or cyclical in its manifestation.”208  More 
specifically, the signs of such illness may be affected by such factors as 
season of the year, typically worse in the fall and winter and better in the 
spring, and even by the time of day at which a person is observed.  Persons 
suffering a major depression, for example, are often subject to sharp mood 
fluctuations, generally being “down” in the early morning after awakening, 
better in mid-morning, “down” again in the early afternoon, and better 
again in late afternoon.209  Because of these variations, diagnosis can be 
quite difficult.  When the patient is President of the United States, it would 
be even more difficult, since access to the President would be limited and 
his or her status is so high. 
It is also worth remembering that the line between mental illness and 
normalcy tends to be indefinite.  Many mental health practitioners insist 
that mental health should be viewed not as an absolute but as a continuum.  
Manfred Kets de Vries and Danny Miller, for example, point out that “[w]e 
all have certain mildly dysfunctional neurotic traits.  These might involve 
shyness, depression, irrational fears, suspicion and so on.  Everyone shows 
some of these characteristics sometimes.  Indeed, ‘normality’ entails many 
quite different neurotic traits.”210  This is not problematic since most people 
with mild or relatively mild neurotic traits function quite well in their day-
to-day activities.  However, gradations of mental health or illness present 
significant problems for psychiatrists under the most favorable of diagnostic 
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conditions.  Even given a diagnosis of depression, schizophrenia, or 
paranoia, for example, how depressed, schizophrenic, or paranoid must a 
President be before Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment should be 
invoked?  How high the level of impairment?  Would the President’s 
physicians (or the medical community in general) be able to reach 
consensus on these questions, or would its judgments likely be divided?  
Would political actors put their trust in the judgments of physicians or the 
medical community, particularly if, as seems likely, disagreements existed?  
Would it be prudent for them to do so? 
Further, the mental health community differs sharply over the diagnostic 
criteria that have been established by the American Psychiatric Association 
for diagnosing the symptoms of mental illness.  Many consider the APA’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) as notably 
imperfect.211  This is the guidebook that heavily determines where “society 
draws the line between normal and not normal, between eccentricity and 
illness, between self-indulgence and self-destruction and, by extension, 
when and how patients should be treated.”212  Dr. Michael First, one of the 
developers of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV 
(DSM-IV), argues: 
 ‘Anything you put in that book, any little change you make, has huge 
implications not only for psychiatry but for pharmaceutical marketing, 
research, for the legal system, for who’s considered to be normal or not, 
for who’s considered disabled . . . . 
 And it has huge implications for stigma . . . because the more disorders 
you put in, the more people get labels, and the higher the risk that some 
get inappropriate treatment.’213 
Herb Kutchins and Stuart A. Kirk point out that “[a]t the center of many 
controversies is the faulty core of the DSM enterprise, the definition of 
mental disorder.”214  They later note “that mental disorders constitute a 
small part of what is described in the current Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders.  Clearly . . . psychiatrists and other mental 
health professionals benefit from DSM’s unrelenting expansion of 
domain.”215  They also warn that the process by which diagnostic categories 
are constructed has “become much more . . . political,” illustrating this 
latter point by writing that “proposals are made, alternatives are suggested, 
and compromises are hammered out and that final decisions are made by 
committee vote.”216  The process tends to be more “political” than 
“medical” and “newly minted proposals for [new categories of mental 
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disorder] can rapidly be pressed into political service.”217  The mere 
possibility that the identification and diagnosis of mental disorders could be 
affected by political factors is highly disturbing, particularly within the 
parameters of determining presidential disability. 
Dr. Lawrence C. Mohr, White House Physician from 1987 to 1993, has 
suggested that: 
The development of mental illness in any world leader would create a 
difficult and challenging situation.  It is important to understand that the 
term mental illness encompasses a wide variety of medical conditions 
from minor and transient, to serious and potentially harmful.  The 
presence of a major psychotic disorder in which a president is clearly out 
of touch with reality would certainly be a reason to initiate the process of 
presidential disability.  On the other hand, minor mental illnesses such as 
mild situational depression or anxiety, can have very subtle 
manifestations and may or may not impair the ability of a president to 
perform his or her constitutional duties.  In such situations, the extent of 
impairment should be assessed on the basis of adverse effects on 
alertness, cognitive function, judgment, appropriate behavior, the ability 
to choose among options and the ability to communicate clearly.  If any of 
these are impaired, it is my opinion that the powers of the president 
should be transferred to the vice president until the impairment 
resolves.218 
Dr. Mohr’s comments reinforce the point that psychological illness is 
extraordinarily complex and affects people in profoundly different ways.  
This means that the process of determining presidential disability in such 
instances will be very difficult since it will entail the measurement of the 
extent and effects of illness.  The Pierce, Coolidge, and Lincoln 
presidencies help illuminate this same point.  Although these occurred 
many years ago, contemporary psychiatric techniques have not succeeded in 
eliminating the problems highlighted here.  They may never be able to do 
so. 
CONCLUSION 
Having discussed several issues related to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 
I would like to offer three recommendations that might be helpful in the 
area of presidential disability and succession. 
First, a suggestion that I have made before is that a mental health 
specialist, whatever his or her formal assigned title (e.g., stress management 
consultant, relaxation specialist), should be added as a regular member of 
the White House Medical Unit.  There are some eighteen medical 
employees in that office.219  Surely a mental health specialist could be 
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added to that number without fanfare and without exciting too much, if any, 
public notice or concern.  It is important to note that the personnel 
associated with the White House Medical Unit are available to assist all 
White House employees who become ill at work.  Therefore, the mental 
health specialist would not be publicly attached to the President in any 
particular way but rather with the health unit itself.  Operating inside the 
White House, a mental health specialist would be able to see the President 
often and at close range and might be able to detect signs of psychological 
dysfunction or behavior modification.  The specialist might well assist the 
President in developing coping mechanisms for stress and could also assist 
in treating substance abuse, whether drugs or alcohol, by the President or 
members of his family and staff.  Such arrangements would become routine 
and would make a consultation with a mental health specialist easier for the 
President and unlikely to excite public furor. 
Second, as a former member of the Working Group on Presidential 
Disability, I endorse strongly its recommendation that in the transition 
period before each new President is inaugurated, the President-elect, the 
Vice President-elect, their key aides, and even members of their families 
should develop a detailed, written contingency plan that specifies 
conditions under which a transfer of power should be considered and that 
this plan be ready to go into effect at the time of the inauguration.  The plan 
should delineate 
alterations of function, including cognitive, judgmental, behavioral, and 
communicative capacities, which should cause consideration of a transfer 
of power.  It must define precise lines of authority and communication 
and specify exact procedures for its execution.  It should also include 
detailed instructions for specific procedures and lines of communication 
to be followed for implementing the provisions of Sections 3 and 4, 
respectively.220 
The President’s prior approval of the plan would allow personal physicians 
to release medical information without fear of violating doctor-patient 
confidentiality.221  It would also signify explicit presidential approval for 
the transition being instituted, thereby lessening public uneasiness. 
The George H. W. Bush Administration conducted a meeting to evaluate 
the procedures involved in any invocation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
in April 1989, three months after Bush’s Inauguration.222  It would have 
been preferable, however, for such contingency planning to have begun and 
been completed prior to the President’s inauguration.  Likewise, had the 
Reagan transition team confronted this issue prior to January 20, 1981, 
Section 3 of the Amendment would almost certainly have been invoked 
after the near fatal assassination attempt against the President that occurred 
two months later.  This would have eliminated, or at least reduced greatly, 
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the confusion and disorder that ensued after the shooting, particularly when 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced—quite incorrectly—on 
national television that he was “in control here at the White House.”223  
Reagan himself later complained about Haig’s behavior, writing in his 
autobiography that “[o]n the day I was shot, George Bush was out of town 
and Haig immediately came to the White House and claimed he was in 
charge of the country.”224  If there had been contingency planning prior to 
the Reagan inauguration, however, the disorder would have been minimized 
since the Vice President almost certainly would have assumed the powers 
(but not the office) of the presidency and would have become the 
acknowledged Acting President. 
In contemporary times, conditions relative to terrorist attacks must also 
be included in contingency planning.  If, for example, the President is 
missing or unaccounted for after a terrorist attack for a specified period of 
time, the plan approved should indicate that the Vice President must move 
to take the reins of power as Acting President and that the President has 
specifically instructed the Vice President to do so.  If the President and Vice 
President are both missing or unaccounted for after such an attack for a 
specified period of time, the official next in the line of succession should 
move into the breach as Acting President, exactly as the President, Vice 
President, and key aides had agreed beforehand.  The clear existence of 
prior consent should greatly facilitate the process of succession during such 
a traumatic event. 
Third, I would recommend rejection of those proposals made periodically 
that Congress should establish, by statute or by concurrent resolution, a 
Standing Medical Panel composed of physicians who would examine the 
President annually and then issue a report containing their medical findings 
to the Vice President, Cabinet, and public.  The several proposals for such 
panels that have been made differ in terms of their details.225  Rather than 
direct my present comments to any one of them in particular, I prefer to 
offer several general observations that might well be applicable to all such 
plans since the problems presented here with regard psychological illnesses 
seem relevant to all. 
The Pierce, Coolidge, and Lincoln case studies presented earlier should 
make clear that there are subtle but important variations among psychiatric 
illnesses.  Some illnesses tend to be debilitating; others are not.  Some 
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persist for lengthy periods of time; others do not.  As has been shown, it can 
be extraordinarily difficult for mental health professionals to diagnose 
accurately specific mental illnesses since their symptoms can be so similar 
while their effects are so dramatically different.  These variations help 
determine whether the patient will be able to carry out his or her 
responsibilities adequately or will lapse into massive disengagement.  
Given the great difficulty in diagnosing specific psychological illnesses and 
the varying impairment levels that attach to each, it would be unwise to 
establish any system in which physicians would “examine” the 
psychological health of the President on a periodic basis and then make 
their findings public. 
If the so-called “experts” on the Medical Panel were unanimous in a 
negative diagnosis, the President would almost certainly respond by 
presenting contrary evaluations by a different group of eminent “experts.”  
The Vice President and Cabinet would then have two differing medical 
judgments from which to choose, and their tendency would likely be to 
support the panel favoring the President.  They might well be seen as overly 
ambitious or disloyal if they did not.  Even though likely to “win” in such a 
situation, the President would be badly damaged in the interchange because 
he or she would be seen by the public and the political elite as being 
medically compromised. 
If the panel of “experts” disagreed with each other with regard to their 
diagnoses, the political system would likely be paralyzed since political 
decision-makers would be justifiably confused and reluctant to act.  
Moreover, the President would once again be grievously compromised.  In 
fact, the President would be compromised even if a majority of the experts 
found him or her competent to exercise the powers and duties of office 
while a minority, perhaps even one member, disagreed.  In short, a divided 
vote even in favor of the President would be politically debilitating.  It 
would be used against the President in various venues by political enemies, 
political pundits, talk show hosts, comedians, etc.—despite the fact that the 
negative “judge” or “judges” on the panel might have been wholly incorrect 
in assessing his or her health status. 
Let us not forget that physicians often disagree with each other in their 
diagnoses and prognoses.  In civil trials, this leaves jurors in great 
confusion and also allows lawyers to latch on to whatever psychiatric 
theories they choose.226  Let us also not forget that physicians—even 
presidential physicians—are at least occasionally incorrect when they offer 
diagnoses and prognoses.  In the mid-1950s, for example, after President 
Eisenhower’s massive heart attack, two of his physicians, both eminent 
cardiologists, recommended privately to Eisenhower that he not seek 
another term as President.  One of them went so far as to warn Eisenhower 
that his heart had developed a dangerous aneurysm of the left ventricle, 
which he thought would produce serious complications, such as congestive 
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heart failure, stroke, and sudden death.227  The third member of 
Eisenhower’s medical team, a general practitioner rather than a cardiologist, 
recommended privately to Eisenhower that he should indeed run, but he 
was the only one of the Eisenhower medical team to do so. 
Despite the fact that the weight of medical opinion clearly stood against 
another candidacy, Eisenhower ignored his cardiologists’ advice and threw 
his hat into the ring.  As we all know, he was re-elected, served out the four 
years of his second term and lived eight additional years, dying in March 
1969 at the age of seventy-eight.  Interestingly, he managed to outlive both 
the presidential and vice presidential candidates on the Democratic Party 
ticket that had opposed him in the 1956 re-election battle.  If the three 
medical “experts” had sat on a Medical Panel and had gone public in early 
1956 with their various opinions concerning the President’s cardiac status, 
would the national interest have been served?  Two of these “experts” 
clearly were wrong in their judgments; should Eisenhower have deferred to 
them by stepping aside?  If he had done so, or if he had been defeated at the 
polls due to voters’ fears of his likely demise, the presidency would have 
passed on to other hands, specifically because two eminent cardiologists 
were incorrect in their public prognoses concerning a sitting President’s 
health. 
Psychiatry, perhaps, is even more daunting a challenge than cardiology.  
This fact has not changed with time.  Therefore, it would seem 
extraordinarily unwise to thrust the vicissitudes of psychiatric diagnosis and 
the various divisions in the psychiatric community onto the national public 
stage.  Yet this is precisely what recommendations for “Standing Medical 
Panels” would do.228  If such panels—as well as the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment—had existed at the time of their presidencies and if 
psychiatrists had publicly diagnosed their respective ailments, Pierce and 
Coolidge might well have been relieved of their powers and duties under 
Section 4 of the Amendment.  Perhaps this would have been appropriate in 
each case.  But Lincoln might have been relieved of his powers and duties 
under these circumstances as well—even though we now know that he 
survived his depression and continued to lead the country with skill and 
dedication.  This would have been highly unfair to Lincoln and 
extraordinarily tragic for the country. 
All of this means that medical evaluations must be handled sensitively 
rather than publicly; that physicians must play an important advisory role in 
determining presidential disability but must do so in a way that does not 
deprive political actors of the opportunity to exercise their own independent 
judgment on such issues, rejecting negative or uncertain medical advice if 
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they see fit to do so.  It also means that the role played by the medical 
advisors involved in the disability process must not damage either the 
President or the presidency itself.  Since presidential power consists in large 
measure of the ability to persuade, processes that compromise 
inappropriately a President’s persuasive abilities must be avoided.  After 
all, it would be difficult for a President to persuade when he or she is seen 
as standing on the threshold of eternity or on the precipice of a serious 
mental breakdown.  Finally, with great respect to the medical community, it 
means that physicians must be seen as human beings, not as infallible gods.  
Since they are not gods, they should not speak ex cathedra on any 
“Standing Medical Panels.” 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment is an important and valuable addition to 
the Constitution.  This is not to say, however, that it can resolve all 
instances of presidential disability.  Particularly perhaps in the case of 
psychological illness, difficulties in diagnosis pose formidable problems.  
The illnesses are so many, the symptoms so similar, the effects so different, 
the treatments so varied, that psychological dysfunction will likely 
challenge the political process for a long time to come, if not for all time.  
No addition of constitutional provisions, no matter how detailed or 
brilliantly crafted, is likely to remedy the situation since no conceivable 
language could cover all possible psychiatric scenarios.  The law cannot 
codify that which medicine has yet to definitively resolve.  Hence, the 
problem lies not with the law but with the medicine and the inherent 
difficulties associated with a field whose subjects—from pauper to 
President—are ever-changing, often complicated, and rather unpredictable 
human beings. 
 
